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Abstract 
Inspired from the key distribution scheme of Du’s rectangle scheme, we propose a new hexagon scheme. With the 
same grid number t and n, the same farthest distance between two neighbor grids R, the new scheme’s coverage is 
0.5988 larger, and the Pl is higher than Du’s method. Also, our method can perform better when the same number of 
nodes has been compromised. Furthermore, we make use of the hexagon scheme as well as the bivariate scheme and 
propose a new and improved scheme. The improved scheme achieves better local connectivity, stronger attack-
resistant ability, and supports larger scale networks than the primitive bivariate polynomial scheme. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1.  Introduction  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a special kind of ad-hoc network, but has many new application 
areas such as military target tracking, environment monitoring, patient monitoring and scientific 
exploration in dangerous environment etc. When sensor networks are deployed in a hostile terrain, security 
becomes extremely important, as they are     vulnerable to different types of malicious attacks. Public key 
such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) can achieve good security performance [1]. But it requires 
high computation and communication ability, which is not suit for resource-limited WSNs since sensor 
nodes usually have only 8-bits CPU. Thus,the symmetric key is still a better choice for WSNs. 
2. Deployment Model Of Sensor Nodes 
Assume that nodes will be static after they have been deployed. When nodes are dropped from a high 
place, such as helicopter, they are distributed by group. Clearly, nodes in the same group or neighbor 
groups will have higher probability to communicate with each other. We use the two-dimensional Gaussian 
distribution model as in [2], which is much closer to the real state. 
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2.1 The Hexagon Partition Model 
Suppose that the total area is X meters in width, Y meters in length, and it is divided into t × n groups. 
We use hexagon with the same size to divide the whole area, and the group number increases from left to 
right at the direction of x-axis, from the bottom up in the direction of y-axis. Let 
<i,j> (1 ,1 )i t j nd d d d  denote the group ID showninFig.1, whose center is locate at the point (xi,yi) . 
 
Figure 1. Hexagon Partition of Groups 
Nodes in group <i,j> are planed to place around the centroid (xi,yi)  and probability density function 
(pdf) for nodes in the group <i,j> is: 
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where ı is the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution and the probability of nodes within 3ı 
area is 0.9987. As nodes of the entire network are uniformly distributed, nodes in each group have the 
same global distribution probability: 
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2.2 The Comparison of rectangle and hexagon partition 
We give a comparable analysis of Du’s rectangle partition manner and our hexagon partition manner 
use method introduced by GAF in [3]. Assume the furthest distance between two adjacent groups is R and 
all the groups have the same size, we can get that each rectangle’s coverage is R2/ from Fig. 2. But each 
hexagon can hold 23 3 / 26R , which is 1.5988 times the rectangle in size. Moreover, hexagon is close to 
the cellular communication model in practice. Compared with other shapes that can be repeated over a 
continuous field such as triangle and rectangle, hexagon has the smallest number of neighbors, i.e., six, 
while the triangle has twelve and the rectangle has eight. 
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Figure 2. Group Size of Rectangle and Hexagon 
Notations and their usage this paper uses are: 
N: total number of nodes 
S: key pool or polynomials pool 
|S|: the size of  S 
SC : keys or polynomials deployed in one group 
|SC |: the size of SC 
m: the largest number of keys each node holds 
x: the number of nodes compromised 
Pl : the probability of local connectivity 
Pg : the probability of global connectivity 
PC : the probability of damage 
r: node’s communication radius 
a: coverage factor of two neighbor groups 
3. Hexagon Key Distribution Scheme 
3.1  Key Assignment to Hexagon group 
 Assume that each group holds |SC| keys. The following is our assignment method in detail: 
x Key server who is responsible for distribute keys first selects |SC| keys from the key pool 
Srandomly, those selected keys consist of a new small key pool SC and  are assigned to the first 
group <1 , 1>. Those |SC | keys then will be deleted from the key pool S. 
x Use method in step 2, select |SC| keys for the next group <i,j> with the first index 3 i td d ,if i>t 
assign keys for groups with a new row j and column number i from 1 to t until all the t × n groups 
get their small key pool SC . 
 Yanan Wang et al. /  Physics Procedia  25 ( 2012 )  560 – 567 563
 
 
Figure 3. An example of key distribution 
An example of key assignment method to every group is shown in Fig. 3 when t=6  and n=5 . 
After assigning the small key pool to groups, each group has Ȧ|SC| keys different from the other groups. 
An example of the size of Ȧ is shown in Fig. 3. Ȧ is related to the coverage factor a. More precisely, 
besides the first group with Ȧ=1 , there are two kinds of Ȧ according to the parity of t: 
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The key pool S is the sum of all the different keys, regardless if t is an even or odd. From the coverage 
coefficient as in Fig. 3, the number of groups t and n, the relationship between the number of all the keys 
|S| and the number of keys assigned to each group |SC| is: 
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3.2 Key Establishment between Nodes 
After each group obtains a small key pool, the key server then randomly chooses keys from the small 
key pool SC and assigns those random selected keys to nodes in that group. 
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The above are steps to establish keys between a pair of nodes. We can summarize it as : 1) nodes select 
keys from the key pool SC ; 2) Broadcast key IDstoestablishacommon key with neighbors ; 3) Use the 
secure path established by the second step to negotiate keys with nodes share no key after step 2. 
4. Performance Analysis For Hexagon Scheme 
In the sequel, our scheme is called a hexagon scheme. Compared with the rectangle scheme, the new 
scheme performs better in local connectivity, requires less key storage under the same connectivity 
probability. Under the same attack, the hexagon scheme has higher attack-resistant ability. 
4.1 Local Connectivity 
Local connectivity is the probability of two nodes find their common keys, let A(ni,nj) be the event of 
two nodes ni and nj be neighbors and B(ni,nj) be the event of two nodes share at least one common key, 
then the connectivity Pl can be calculated by (6): 
( ( , ) | ( , ))l i j i jP p B n n A n n                                                           (6) 
Assume each node can hold m keys at most, m is usually no more than 200 [2] [4]. In fact, Pl can be 
calculated in another way. Assume that two nodes ni and nj are neighbors, the first node ni selects k keys 
from the shared Ȝ ×|SC| keys with its neighbor (Ȝ is 1, 0, or a) and another m í k keys from (1í Ȝ) ×|SC| 
keys that owned only by the group which it locate, the second node nj selects m keys from the small key 
pool SC with k keys selected by the first node removed. Hence, the local connectivity is described in (7), 
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Suppose |S|=100000 ,t= n=10 , the coverage factor a =0.125.If a ×|SC| is not an integer, we use the 
largest integer that is less than or equal to a ×|SC|.TABLEIisthe relationship between coverage factor a and 
the small key pool |SC|.  
TABLE I. |SC| FOR DIFFERENT COVERAGE FACTOR a 
Coverage Factor a  Rectangle scheme  Hexagon scheme 
0.125 1746 1484 
0.105 1560 1377 
0.085 1409 1285 
0.065 1285 1204 
Subsisting the parameter |S|,t,n above with a=0.125 ,we get the size of small key pool |SC|. The local 
connectivity with coverage a is computed from (7). 
Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the number of keys m and the local connectivity Pl with coverage 
a.FromFig.4,we can see that our hexagon scheme performs better than the basic scheme [2] and Du’s 
rectangle scheme. When each node holds 100 keys, the local connectivity of the basic scheme is 0.0952, 
with coverage a=0.125, the rectangle scheme is 0.687, our scheme is 0.757. Given the same furthest 
distance R between two adjacent groups, our scheme’s coverage area is 0.5988 larger than that of the 
rectangle scheme. 
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Figure 4. Memory usage m vs. Local connectivity 
4.2 Global connectivity 
From the local connectivity Pl we can get the global connectivity Pg . The global connectivity Pg is the 
ratio of the largest connected component to all the nodes in the network. The number of neighbor a node 
has is n’:  n’=(ʌ × r2 × N )/ (X × Y) , r is node’s communication radium. Node degree d is the number of 
nodes that own the  same keys: d= n’h Pl =(N í1) × (loge(N)+c /N (c is a constant got from Pg ). Global 
connectivity Pg computed from c is: 
ce
gP e
  . The relationship between P and P is described in (8), 
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In the rectangle scheme, r is supposed to 40m, and  X=Y =1000m,N=10000 ,t=n=10 . From section II 
we can know the hexagon scheme will hold . 1.5988×105m2 with all the other parameters the same as the 
rectangle scheme.TABLE II lists the local probability according to the global connectivity. 
TABLE II. LOCAL CONNECTIVITY Plvs. GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY Pg 
Pg 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.99 
Pl of rectangle scheme 0.1666 0.1849 0.2036 0.2279 0.2746 
Pl of hexagon scheme 0.2663 0.2956 0.3256 0.3644 0.4391 
From TABLE II we can know Pl increases with the ascending of Pg . Under the same Pg , our scheme’s 
Pl is higher than that of rectangle scheme, that is to say, nodes in our scheme will hold more neighbors than 
the rectangle scheme. 
4.3 Security Analysis 
When nodes have been captured, as those nodes hold part of the keys the un-compromised nodes still 
use, the adversary can do damage to the communication of the un-compromised nodes. The probability that 
a node dose not share any key with the compromised node is: 1í m/|S|. Assume there are x compromised 
nodes, then the probability of the communication being compromised PC is: 
1 (1 )
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We make an comparison of four schemes with the local connectivity Pl =0.33. , the basic scheme’s 
storage requirement m is 200; the rectangle scheme’s m is 45; while our scheme’s m is 38. The q-
composite scheme [3] is also used in our comparison, we choose q=1,2,3 respectively. 
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Figure 5. Number of nodes compromised vs. PC 
Fig. 5 describes the relation that the number of nodes the adversary has compromised vs. the damage 
adversary can do to the network. It can be seen that our scheme is the best one compared with the other 
schemes. When 1000 nodes have been compromised, 86.49% communication of the un-compromised 
nodes will be under the adversary’s control in the basic scheme, 84% in the q=1 scheme, 99.63% in the q 
scheme, 99.97% in the q=3 scheme, 36.24% in Du’s rectangle scheme, 31.61% in our scheme. 
5. Enhancement Of The Hexagon Scheme 
This section shows a further improvement scheme based on the hexagon scheme and the basic bivariate 
polynomial scheme, which achieves a better performance.  
5.1 Enhancement of the bivariate polynomial scheme  
The new scheme makes use of the symmetric bivariate polynomial and the hexagon scheme described 
in section III. In this new scheme, |S| is used to denote the total number of polynomials, |SC| denotes the 
number of polynomials for each hexagon, a denotes the coverage factor as the hexagon scheme, and Pl can 
be obtained from (10), Ȝ is 0, 1, or a.The key server distributes polynomial to each node use the manner 
described in section III, the relationship between |S| and |SC| is the same as the hexagon scheme (5). All the 
environment parameter assumptions are the same as the hexagon scheme except |S|=600 . The number of 
polynomials |S’| each node holds is / ( 1)m t « »¬ ¼  is the degree of the polynomial, m is the storage ability 
of the node). 
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Herein we replace m be |S’| in (7) to get the local connectivity (10) of the new scheme. 
As a whole, with the same polynomial degree t, the new scheme can achieve a better local connectivity 
Pl than the polynomial scheme. When |S|=600 ,t=49 ,m ,the Pl of our new scheme is higher than 0.6063 
while the primitive scheme is 0.0149. From subsection B of section IV, we can see Pg increases as Pl 
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ascending, so under the same setting the new scheme has a higher global connectivity than the primitive 
polynomial scheme. 
When no more than t keys derived from the same polynomial have been compromised, the network is 
perfectly secure. If x nodes have been compromised, the probability that the adversary can communicate 
with the un-compromised nodes is PC: 
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When Pl =0.33 , if 20000 nodes have been compromised, in our scheme, 90.34% of the network is 
compromised when t=49 ; 0.25% of nodes in the network are compromised when t=99 .  
6. Conclusion And Work For The Future 
In the future, we will improve the q-composite scheme and the Blom’s key distribution scheme by 
using our hexagon group partition method, while multi-path or multi-hop will be used further to improve 
the performance of our new schemes. Routing protocols such as Directed Diffusion (DD), LEACH, GEAR 
and their improved schemes which are widely used in WSNs introduced in [6] can also be used. 
Furthermore, key distribution can also take place during route construction.  
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